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ABSTRACT
Current debates about the possible causes of depression 
reinforce the age- old body–mind dualism: while some 
claim that depression is caused by psychological or 
societal stress, others underline that it results from 
a shortage of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the 
central nervous system. This paper shows that Michel 
Houellebecq’s latest novel Serotonin can be read as 
an account of depression that goes beyond this body–
mind dualism. Moreover, we will argue that his way of 
narrating invites us to reconsider the restorative power 
of narrative in ’pathography,’ a genre that is a primary 
focus within medical humanities. The first section of the 
paper discusses, while drawing on Wilson’s work on 
new materialism, that although the title of the novel 
Serotonin may suggest that Houellebecq takes sides with 
those who believe that depression is a brain disease, 
the protagonist of the novel suffers mainly from his gut 
feelings, which affects his entire embodied existence. 
Against the background of Merleau- Ponty’s philosophy, 
the second section specifies this existential disruption 
in terms of an embodied ’I cannot.’ In the third section, 
we make clear how Houellebecq’s way of narrating—
plotless and episodic—reinforces these embodied 
feelings of incapacity. The final section, then, traces how 
Houellebecq, by means of his style of writing and his 
choice of themes, succeeds in transferring gut feelings 
onto the reader. If illness narratives aim at sharing 
experiences of illness, the ’narrative’ of depression, so 
we argue, had better take the form of an anti- narrative 
or a chaos story. Indeed, Houellebecq’s anti- narrative 
succeeds in passing on to the reader the experience of 
a debilitating gut feeling, and a gradual loss of grip that 
manifests itself as a temporal and spatial disorientation.
INTRODUCTION
Depression is an urgent public health problem of 
our time. According to the WHO, 300 million 
people suffer from it at one point in their lives. Yet, 
when it comes to knowledge and insight into its 
nature and causes, much remains unclear. Depres-
sion has a heterogeneous clinical picture, meaning 
that the process and the response to treatment 
differ from patient to patient. Indeed, its psycho-
therapeutic and biological methods of treatment, as 
well as its aetiology and pathogenesis, are subject to 
ongoing debate. Whereas some claim that depres-
sion is caused by psychological or societal stress, 
others underline that it results from a shortage 
of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the central 
nervous system. These debates reinforce an age- 
old mind–body dualism, for indeed, they suggest 
that the cause of the depression should be sought 
either in some bodily (neurological) defect or in ill- 
working psychological capacities.
In this paper, we will show that Michel Houel-
lebecq’s latest novel Serotonin can be read as an 
account of depression that goes beyond this body–
mind dualism.1 Informed by theories from new 
materialism and phenomenology, we will read 
depression in Serotonin as an embodied and affec-
tive phenomenon. Moreover, we will entertain 
the possibility that Houellebecq’s style of writing 
depression, as well as his thematic choice, evokes 
fellow feelings of disorientation and dislocation in 
the reader. At first sight, Houellebecq’s novel can 
therefore be seen as a fictional illness narrative, 
which gives voice to a person’s lived experiences 
from a first person’s perspective.
However, when we look closely at the presenta-
tion of the depressive experiences of its protago-
nists, we see characteristics that problematise a 
straightforward categorisation as fictional illness 
narrative. Houellebecq’s particular mode of pathog-
raphy seems to resist ‘narrative,’ when we take this 
to refer to accounts that take the form of a story, 
that order events in time (with a beginning, middle 
and end structure), and involve changes over time 
that affect a subject or a protagonist. This manner 
of presentation has received a lot of attention in 
medical humanities research. In looking for causal 
relations and explanations and thus answering the 
question ‘why me?’, narrative can indeed help the 
subject of illness trace a single self throughout a 
series of discontinuous and often disruptive events. 
In a way, it normalises and re- familiarises the 
depressive episode as an experience, and while illu-
minating medical language, it can facilitate a better 
understanding of one’s experience.2 As Hilary Clark 
writes, “narratives stitch up the wounds resulting 
from traumatic events or simply unexpected 
change.”3 The form of the story helps to retroac-
tively make sense of a depressive episode by placing 
it back in a diachronic continuity, thus giving the 
narrative self a renewed sense of coherence.
This may give the impression that narrative is 
the only viable form in which to communicate such 
experiences. Yet, there are obvious challenges to 
narrating depression: depressive experiences are 
hard to describe adequately due to cognitive imped-
iments and distortions. They are characterised by 
decidedly anti- narrative, or narrative- resistant, 
elements. In Reading for the Plot, narratologist Peter 
Brooks argued that plot is the ‘design’ of any narra-
tive: it consists of intentional structures, of every 
element that pushes the story forward and steers 
it towards a conclusion.4 If the motor of narrative 
“ is desire, totalizing, building ever- larger units of 
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meaning, the ultimate determinants of meaning lie at the end, and 
narrative desire is ultimately, inexorably, desire for the end.”5 In 
order for a story to commence, an agent must want something. 
Yet, as Arthur Frank has written, “[illness] often precipitates a 
condition of lacking desire.”6 And more in particular, depres-
sion is often characterised by such a lack of desire (emblematised 
by Melville’s Bartleby’s characteristic ‘I’d prefer not to’). It is 
further marked by the impotence to act, while actions are gener-
ally considered to be the building blocks of the plot.
Houellebecq’s ‘narration’ of depression, so we claim, can be 
interpreted as an account of this lack of desire which results in 
a corresponding lack of plot. Houellebecq is arguably the most 
notorious contemporary European writer of depression: all his 
protagonists suffer from depression in some form or other, or to 
be more precise: they are depressed, white males. His oeuvre has 
been described as chronicling ‘the last gasps of the once domi-
nant white male.’7 Depression in his literary works has predom-
inantly been interpreted by critics as critique of a sick social and 
political climate in the West, which is losing its possibilities for 
the future because of undermining neoliberal forces in its soci-
eties, leading to a crisis of imagination.8 Many have remarked 
on the connection his texts forge between sexual and political 
impotence, and the connection between the sick male body and 
the declining health of the nation and of French society.9 To the 
extent that there is no viable alternative to neoliberal capitalism, 
the Western world is at the end of its history, or, in the words of 
the narrator of Houellebecq’s The Possibility of an Island (2005), 
“The future was empty.”10
Even though this societal critique is an important thread 
throughout Serotonin, we have chosen another angle: Houelle-
becq’s writing allows for an alternative view on depression. In 
Serotonin, we argue, depression entails the breakdown of our 
embodied existence, manifesting itself in feelings of discourage-
ment and disgust (être écoeuré), and the gradual elimination of 
bodily possibilities for engagement with the environment. While 
using elements of Frank’s ‘chaos narrative,’11 marked by an 
open- ended structure and an absence of recovery, and episodic or 
paratactic, anti- cathartic temporal ordering, Houellebecq ampli-
fies embodied feelings of disgust, temporal dislocation and non- 
catharsis in the protagonist and the reader alike. Analysing this 
literary work from a framework of phenomenological philos-
ophy, we aim for two contributions to research in the medical 
humanities: (1) to add to an existing body of research into 
alternative pathographies beyond the narrative paradigm;12 (2) 
to address, nuance and complicate the prevalent understanding 
of depression as a brain or mood disorder, by showing how it 
involves the whole body and mind, as a relational phenomenon 
that affects the subject as an embodied being.
FROM BRAIN TO GUT
Serotonin tells the story of the depressed Florent- Claude 
Labrouste, a 46- year- old agricultural engineer who ends a love-
less relationship with the 20- years younger, thoroughly spoilt, 
Japanese woman Yuzu. After a joyless holiday in Spain, he 
decides he wants to disappear. He has had enough of Yuzu and 
his job at the Ministry of Agriculture. Inspired by a TV docu-
mentary called Voluntarily Missing, he deletes his internet pres-
ence, abandons his job and leaves his apartment without telling 
anyone where to or why. With the money from his parents’ 
inheritance, he can afford to stop working and to take up resi-
dence in a Parisian hotel.
The story meanders between this present and Florent- Claude's 
memories. As he sinks further and further into apathy and 
impotence, he considers himself to be dying, and decides, as a 
kind of farewell ritual, that he wants to see people who were 
important to him. As such, he embarks on a road trip he also 
calls “a mini farewell ceremony for my libido” (p. 163). He visits 
his old student friend Aymeric, a dairy farmer of noble descent, 
who is in a much worse state than Florent- Claude because his 
wife and children have left him and his farm is deteriorating 
and going bankrupt. During a peasant revolt against the imposed 
milk quota, Aymeric commits suicide and becomes a hero in the 
eyes of the local population. With respect to these events in his 
life, Florent- Claude is only a passive observer, a bystander. In 
the same way, he only watches, from a distance, how his great 
lost love, Camille, leads a life of her own as a veterinarian. He 
loses himself in elaborate fantasies of shooting her 4- year- old 
son, but does not follow through, and returns to his Parisian 
hotel instead. As soon as the hotel adopts a strictly non- smoking 
policy, he feels compelled to move to an anonymous residential 
tower. Here he spends his days smoking and watching television, 
supported by the use of the antidepressant Captorix. Finding 
himself “essentially deprived of reasons to live and of reasons to 
die” (p. 74), he is “dying of sorrow” (p. 280).
With the title of the book, Serotonin, Houellebecq seems to 
directly situate the story of the depressed Florent- Claude within 
the neurobiological explanation model of depression, which is 
dominant today. Serotonin is a neurotransmitter, a substance 
responsible for enabling communication between nerve cells.13 
Around the 1950s, it was discovered, by accident, that drugs 
that supposedly enhance the level of serotonin caused consid-
erable mood improvement in people suffering from depression. 
The first generation of these drugs still caused major side effects. 
In the late 1980s, the second generation—the so- called selec-
tive serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) such as Prozac and 
serotonin- norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), such as 
Effexor—was launched on the health market. These promised 
major mood enhancement and fewer side effects.14 Since that 
time, consumption of antidepressants has increased enormously, 
worldwide. Nikolas Rose estimates that in between 1990 
and 2000, the prescription of antidepressants in the USA has 
increased by 1300 per cent.15 In pace with that consumption, 
depression is increasingly considered as a kind of brain disorder. 
It has become rather common to say that depression is caused by 
a shortage of serotonin, or at least by some chemical imbalance 
in the brain.16
Houellebecq seems to follow this kind of reasoning when he 
center- stages Florent- Claude’s consumption of the (fictional) 
antidepressant Captorix, which is described as follows:
It is a small white, oval, scored tablet. It doesn’t create or transform; 
it interprets. It renders fleeting what was definitive; it renders con-
tingent what was ineluctable. It supplies a new interpretation of life 
– less rich, less artificial, and marked by a certain rigidity. It provides 
no form of happiness, or even of real relief; its action is of a different 
kind: by transforming life into a sequence of formalities it allows you 
to fool yourself. On this basis, it helps people to live, or at least to not 
die – for a certain period of time. (p. 308)
In the story world of Serotonin, use of this medicine seems 
common enough. Doctor Azote does not even inquire into 
Florent- Claude’s circumstances and life before asserting that 
“[w]hat’s you need to do is to keep your serotonin at the correct 
level – right now it’s okay, you’re fine – but lowering the cortisol, 
and maybe increasing dopamine and endorphins, that would 
be ideal” (p. 281). The patient is not treated as an individual 
so much as a puzzle of hormone management. He is invited to 
understand himself in terms of a ‘neurochemical self ’.17
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Since Houellebecq situates the story in a zone between our 
present time and a point in the near future—as he often does 
in his novels—this enables him to introduce some futuristic 
elements. Captorix, he writes in the beginning of the novel, is a 
new kind of antidepressants, which is—in the temporal frame of 
the novel—recently released. At first sight, however, the fictional 
Captorix is very similar to common SSRIs and SNRIs. Like the 
existing antidepressants, it has libido loss, loss of potency and 
nausea as common side effects. Also, while mentioning that the 
drug may work or not without anyone exactly knowing why they 
work or not, Houellebecq underlines the increasingly accepted 
view that doctors and scientist alike do not know what the oper-
ating mechanism of SSRIs and SNRI’s consists of.18 As the doctor 
character says in Serotonin: “if they had to wait to have absolute 
scientific certainty they’d never have put out a single drug on 
the market, you understand all that?” (p. 274). Also, comparable 
with existing antidepressants, Captorix does not really cure, but 
only softens the sharp edges of the depressive state.
Still, Houellebecq’s fictional description of both serotonin 
and the new drug offers a different perspective on depression. 
His narrator describes serotonin as a hormone: “serotonin is 
a hormone related to self- esteem, to the recognition obtained 
within a group… in addition, it was mainly manufactured in 
the intestines” (p. 94). In reality, however, serotonin is not a 
hormone but a neurotransmitter. Even though both substances, 
neurotransmitters and hormones, transmit signals or messages 
through our bodies, they function rather differently. Whereas 
neurotransmitters, which are produced in the neurons, transmit 
electrical signals from one neuron to another across the synapsis, 
hormones, which are produced in various glands and organs, 
transmit chemical signals via the bloodstream. Hormones thus 
easily travel across our whole body, whereas neurotransmitters 
are bound to the small space between the neurons. Houelle-
becq’s choice to describe serotonin as a hormone underlines how 
the substance, and thus the drug, affects the entire body and not 
just the central nervous system.
Even more interesting is his remark that serotonin in all living 
beings, including amoebas, is mainly manufactured in the intes-
tines and, in line with this, that Captorix is more effective than 
existing drugs since it directly releases serotonin in the gastro-
intestinal mucosa. Captorix produces a form of serotonin, 
which differs from natural serotonin. Existing antidepressants, 
however, do not produce artificial serotonin. They rather aim 
at restoring the serotonin balance in the synapsis—the space 
between the neurons—while inhibiting the reuptake of serotonin 
in the neuron. Locating the production of both natural and arti-
ficial serotonin in the intestinal tract, Houellebecq emphasises 
the visceral dimension of being depressed. For Houellebecq, we 
will argue, depression is more about the gut than about the brain.
This shift in attention from brain to gut has also been stressed 
by Elizabeth Wilson’s feminist materialist reading of depres-
sion.19 Mainstream feminist criticism of health problems has 
been deeply inspired by social- constructivist theories, which are 
in general ‘anti- biologist.’20 Wilson, by contrast, believes that 
biology should be given a prominent role in the explanation of 
depression. Instead of reinstalling the idea of biological matter 
as passive and receptive, she wants to focus on the active and 
dynamic role that matter plays. Accounting for matter’s agency, 
it becomes clear that matter or nature is in no way culture or 
society’s other.21 Wilson claims that in contemporary debates 
about depression and its treatment, it is believed either that 
depression is caused by a shortage of serotonin in the brain, or 
that depression is caused by society. To go beyond this dualistic 
view, Wilson directs our attention to the role the gut plays in 
depression and during the consumption of antidepressants. Anti-
depressants, first of all, are taken orally (and are not injected 
intravenously); once swallowed, they start their journey through 
the gastrointestinal tract, through the liver, through the blood 
circulation, finally reaching the brain while passing the blood–
brain barrier.
In addition, since the building block of serotonin—trypto-
phan—is an essential amino acid (ie, an amino acid that cannot 
be produced by the body), the production of serotonin is directly 
tied to diet. Some foods contain more tryptophan than others.22 
Underlining that the production of serotonin takes place within 
a network that encompasses the entire body, including dietary 
habits, Wilson rejects the idea of the brain as the alpha and 
omega of psychic distress. Depression thus involves a bioaffec-
tive phenomenon, which concerns the entire body and is part 
of a larger network of cultural and social habits pertaining to 
eating and food.23 Instead of only affecting its ‘final target’—
the synapses in the brain—antidepressants heavily affect the 
gut while travelling through it. That is also why gastrointestinal 
distress, such as nausea, is a common adverse effect of antide-
pressants. The gut is so sensitive because most of the body’s sero-
tonin is stored in the network of nerves in the gut—only five per 
cent of all the body’s serotonin is in the brain.24
For Florent- Claude in Serotonin, the consumption of Captorix 
forms part of his morning ritual for satisfying his oral desires, 
combined with coffee and cigarettes. Food consumption and 
appetite play an important role in his life. Florent- Claude is 
able to enjoy food until the last stages of his depression: in fact, 
besides smoking and watching TV, and alcohol (“Alcohol is very 
important for the elderly, it’s almost all they’ve got left,” p. 152), 
eating is the only activity from which he still derives a modest 
pleasure. Every time he visits a restaurant, the narrator digresses 
into lengthy descriptions of the menu. As we have noted, the 
production of serotonin largely takes place in the gut, hence it 
is closely related to dietary choices. Aptly, among the few things 
the narrator still enjoys is going to a supermarket with an assort-
ment of 14 different kinds of humus—chickpeas containing a 
lot of tryptophan and thus being famous triggers for serotonin.
DEPRESSION AS EMBODIED ‘I CANNOT’
If in Houellebecq’s fictional universe, depression is not located in 
the brain but spread through the gut and hormones affecting the 
entire body, it is a state that he describes in terms of suspended 
agency, of being powerless, a process of becoming increasingly 
incapable and impotent. As the protagonist reports: “I’ve let 
myself be swayed back and forth (laissé balloter) by events” (p. 
11). In hindsight, he never really experienced being in charge of 
his own life and his choices. Most telling examples of him being 
a passive bystander instead of an agent, include the break- ups 
with women he loved: Claire, Kate and Camille. In all cases, he 
passively leaves it to the other to terminate the relationship on 
account of his infidelity. He offers no explanation. He is a slave 
of his desires and hormonal drives, and does not make choices: 
“Once again I didn’t do anything, didn’t say anything, and let 
events run their course” (p. 149).
This incapacity and lack of grip on his life leads to the failure 
and loss of love in his adult life, one of the foci of Florent- Claude's 
depression. Such feelings of powerlessness are not restricted to 
his love life: they govern his whole life. He feels impotent and 
powerless in his job: he has not been able to change the fate of 
French farmers. He is saddened to see, in spite of all his efforts, 
how French agriculture is being crushed in the wheels of the 
free market economy. Houellebecq does not provide a single 
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‘cause’ for Florent- Claude’s depression. Instead, he describes the 
progression of his condition in terms of a progression of feelings 
of incapability. His depression might be triggered by feelings of 
apathy and impotence, but at the same time, it amplifies these 
feelings. He feels that he likes to give in to a ‘lethargic inactivity’ 
(p. 87).
A pivotal role is given to Florent- Claude’s sexual impotence. 
At the beginning, it is indicated that impotence is a side effect 
of the antidepressant Captorix. Yet, he had stopped being sexu-
ally active even before he starts taking that drug. He experiences 
his last sexual eruption during his holiday in Spain, after a brief 
encounter with a young woman with chestnut hair. He keeps on 
dreaming that she will “come to save my cock, my being and my 
soul all at once” (p. 13). When the depression really hits him, 
he loses his libido completely. Florent- Claude himself does not 
seem very saddened by his sexual inertia: Doctor Azote, on the 
other hand, places a lot of emphasis on his impotence.
It might be tempting to interpret Florent- Claude’s experiences 
of impotence in either physiological or psychological terms. For 
indeed, sexual impotence could be explained either in terms of 
some defects in his body, or in terms of a loss of psychic will-
power. We believe, however, that the incapacity that Houelle-
becq describes goes beyond this body–mind reasoning and refers 
to incapacity in an existential sense. To clarify the concept of 
existential impotence, we draw on theories from the tradition 
of existential and phenomenological philosophy. According 
to Heidegger, human existence is characterised by a double- 
sidedness: on the one hand, we are ‘thrown’ in a world that 
we have not chosen ourselves—a world that has already been 
determined by a linguistic, economic and political situation, and 
by certain power relations—but on the other hand, we always 
have the possibility to relate to this facticity.25 Hence, Heidegger 
describes human existence in terms of a ‘thrown- design.’ Sartre, 
who adapted Heidegger’s analysis of human existence into his 
own branch of existentialism, expands on the idea of being 
the designer of your own life. According to him, existentialism 
implies that existence precedes any essence, which means that 
there is no blueprint of how to live your life.26 To exist means 
that you have to shape your own existence while transcending 
given situations. Human existence thus implies radical freedom, 
or better, it implies that you are condemned to freedom. This 
also means that no one but you is responsible for your life. If 
you hide behind an excuse such as ‘I couldn't do anything about 
it,’ then according to Sartre you are in ‘bad faith,’ denying your 
own possibilities. Human existence is characterised by a range 
of possibilities.
His contemporary Merleau- Ponty has criticised Sartre’s idea 
of existence in terms of freedom for being too radical. The main 
difference between Merleau- Ponty, on the one hand, and Sartre, 
on the other hand, is that the first defines human existence as 
being embodied, while the latter does not pay any attention to 
humans’ embodiment. According to Merleau- Ponty, humans are 
embodied beings, not the sum of a body and a mind. Because 
of our embodiment, we are always bound to a certain place or 
environment. However, being embodied does not in any way 
mean that we would be trapped in our bodies (as Plato believed). 
It is precisely because of our bodies that we have possibilities. 
As a critique of Descartes and Kant, Merleau- Ponty argues that 
human existence is not first and foremost an ‘I think,’ but an 
‘I can,’27 which indicates having possibilities. Merleau- Ponty 
explains that this ‘I can’ habitually functions below the level of 
conscious, wilful actions. When, for instance, I grasp a cup of 
tea, I do not have to rely on some preceding mental intention. 
Instead, my arm and hand act while they are invited by the cup 
that is standing in front of me, my arm stretching towards it and 
my hand opening up in such a way that cup and hand instanta-
neously fit together. No thinking or mental act involved here. 
At the same time, Merleau- Ponty calls these types of move-
ment intentional, since they do not involve unconscious reflex 
motility. Grasping a cup is not a reflex, it is a way of mean-
ingfully and intentionally relating to one’s own environment. 
The ‘I can’ thus implies motor intentionality, that is, it is about 
giving meaning to one’s situation while moving one’s body. It 
is because of one’s ‘I can’ that people as embodied beings can 
transcend their actual situation. When someone is only able to 
perform concrete movements to respond to their environment 
(eg, touch one’s nose because of a mosquito sting), one’s tran-
scendence and ‘I can’ is weaker than when one is also able to 
act in manners that are more abstract (eg, touch one’s nose on 
command). In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau- Ponty 
describes how illnesses can diminish a person’s ‘I can.’28 The 
decrease of one’s ‘I can,’ however, is not just about localisable 
defects in the anatomical body (such as the case in infections, 
neurological defects or bone fractures). One’s ‘I can’ is affected 
when one’s possibilities to meaningfully interact with one’s life-
world is disrupted.
What Houellebecq’s novel shows us is that depression can 
be seen as an impairment of this ‘I can,’ which we might call 
an ‘I cannot.’ Florent- Claude’s story is marked by an embodied 
‘I cannot,’ without there being a single localisable defect in his 
body. It is also interesting to note that he only sought medical 
help when he was no longer able to care for himself: get out 
of bed, wash himself, brush his teeth and comb his hair—the 
moment he would prefer not to have a body anymore. The fact 
that he has, and is, a body of which he has to take care becomes 
unbearable for him: “I would have liked to no longer have a 
body; I was finding the prospect of having a body, of having 
to devote care and attention to it, more and more intolerable” 
(p. 78). Even though there is nothing wrong with his body as 
‘musculoskeletal system,’ he is hardly able to move or perform 
actions. Near the end of the story, he has become virtually idle. 
In line with Kevin Aho’s phenomenological analysis of depres-
sion, we could therefore say that depression marks the very 
limits of the idea of existence as transcendence.29 The narratives 
of severely depressed people—such as Florent- Claude’s—show 
that little is left of the potential for transcendence.
CHAOS NARRATIVE AND TEMPORAL DISLOCATION
What does this lack of embodied possibilities, or embodied ‘I 
cannot’ of depression, mean for the possibilities for giving 
narrative form to such experiences? In order to answer this 
question, we need to examine more closely the experience of 
time in depression, and see how this experience is configured 
in Serotonin. In phenomenological philosophy, unlike in diag-
nostic manuals such as the DSM, the experience of temporality 
often has a central place when it comes to explaining experi-
ences of depression. In this tradition, to be human is to be a 
temporal being with a direction, a sense of continuity and a plan 
for the future. In General Psychopathology (1913), philosopher 
and psychiatrist Karl Jaspers notes that this direction and sense 
of futurity is precisely what is lacking in the depressed.30 The 
patient of depression feels nothing, but is aware of this feeling 
of nothing, which Jaspers calls a meta- feeling. In the words of 
German psychiatrist and philosopher Thomas Fuchs, a social and 
biological desynchronisation occurs in depression. In depression, 
time is suddenly noticed: it becomes perceptively and painfully 
out of joint or ‘out of synch.’ Fuchs describes it as a feeling that 
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the present is all there is and all that can ever be imagined to be, 
and that the future is a thing of the past.31
Matthew Ratcliffe argues that it is a common mistake to 
attempt to understand and talk about depressive experience in 
terms of ordinary intentional states (eg, experiencing intense 
negative emotions, making certain types of judgements about the 
world).32 According to him, depression is not an intentional state 
or set of intentional states, but rather a shift in, or loss of, the 
kinds of possibilities that exist for us: particularly, the possibility 
of meaningful events or projects. According to Mikkel Krause 
Frantzen, the psychopathology of depression should be under-
stood in temporal terms, in relation to the problem of time, and 
specifically the problem of futurity. In Going Nowhere Slow, he 
describes it as a ‘chronopathology,’ marked by a loss of futurity, 
of the possibility to imagine the future. He views depression as 
“the (pathological) feeling that history has come to an end, that 
the future is closed off, frozen once and for all.”33
This lack of futurity obviously has consequences for story-
telling possibilities, when we consider narrative as a cause and 
effect trajectory with a beginning, middle and end structure. One 
of the most influential typologies of illness narratives has been 
created by Arthur Frank. In The Wounded Storyteller, Frank 
describes illness narrative as an attempt to regain a voice.34 In 
telling the story of an illness, the ill person claims her body back 
from medicine and makes sense of the illness, as part of the 
healing process. Frank calls this a postmodern experience, in that 
it emphasises the need for a plurality of individual stories. Illness 
narratives allow for reflection and expression in a process where 
the individual searches for explanations and understanding of 
the experience and contextualises it in relation to self and others.
Frank distinguishes three categories of narratives: the resti-
tution narrative, the chaos narrative and the quest narrative. 
In the restitution narrative, a healthy person first becomes sick 
and then recovers. The chaos narrative is marked by an absence 
of this moment of recovery: the protagonist is a victim of bad 
luck. Chaos narratives are not really ‘narratives’ at all, as they 
are incompatible with writing or even telling: “Those who are 
truly living the chaos cannot tell in words… Lived chaos makes 
reflection, and consequently story- telling, impossible.”35 There 
is no clear sequence or discernible causality, hence the chaos 
narrative is really anti- narrative: “chaos is the pit of narrative 
wreckage.”36 The third type, the quest narrative, occurs when 
the illness initiates a spiritual journey. Quest narratives “meet 
suffering head on; accept illness and seek to use it.”37 In a sense, 
the chaos narrative is the most realistic depiction of depres-
sion, as making a story out of these experiences often happens 
only in retrospect, by patients in remission. They are asked to 
“reconfigure their experiences, through the transformative lens 
of memory, to fit the particular stylistic codes of conventional 
narrative, journalistic or autobiographical.”38
Florent- Claude’s narration of depression has characteristics of 
Frank’s chaos narrative. We could say this is the most truthful type 
for a person actually living the depression, as, in Kiki Benzon’s 
words, it is a disease whose ‘anarchic disconnections,’ ‘bifurca-
tion of mood,’ and ‘murky distractedness’ make it incompatible 
with causal systems and linear teleology.39 Serotonin’s protag-
onist does not psychoanalyse himself or try to trace back his 
depression to a point of origin like a childhood trauma. He has 
had loving and caring parents; he completed higher education in 
agriculture and enjoyed his life as a student; he has had mean-
ingful relationships, and he has held well- paid positions in agri-
culture policy. Even though his parents chose to end their lives 
together after his father was diagnosed with an incurable brain 
tumour, Florent- Claude does not describe their sudden suicide 
as a traumatic event. He is, in other words, not prone to looking 
for causal explanations. Unlike in the quest narrative, marked by 
the principle of causality, informing the question ‘why me?’ and 
the quest to lay bare a chain of events explaining the depression 
and recovery, Florent- Claude’s narration is serial, paratactic and 
open- ended. He simply mentions one experience after another, 
without inferring causality or answering the question ‘why’?
When we look at the way the narrator experiences his depres-
sion, it is fitting to see it as a ‘chronopathology,’ marked by the 
increasing impossibility to envision a future. As becomes clear 
from temporal demarcations as “in that commercially toneless 
but socially incompressible space which, in Europe, separates 
lunch from dinner” (p. 22) and “at a time that seemed very long 
ago, that seemed almost to belong to a previous life; a time that 
was in fact less than two months ago” (p. 249), he experiences 
time as out of joint:
I remembered all the places in my life, I remembered them perfectly, 
with surgical and pointless precision. My memory of dates was more 
vague, but dates were unimportant; everything that happened had 
happened for all eternity, I knew that now, But it was an eternity that 
was closed and inaccessible. (p. 301)
Being stuck in time, increasingly his choices and the possibility 
of possibility disappear. This includes bodily actions. When he 
almost drives his car with him and Yuzu off a cliff, the only thing 
preventing him is an involuntary movement: “in a convulsive 
and entirely involuntary movement, I swung violently to the left. 
It was about time, and the front nearside wheel briefly touched 
the stony hard shoulder” (p. 19). This kneejerk reflex is not the 
motor intentionality of the ‘I can,’ it is not an abstract move-
ment allowing him to transcend the situation, even if he saves 
two lives that he had himself endangered. Instead of making 
sense of his predicament by giving it narrative form, Houelle-
becq presents his protagonist’s depression as a progressive inca-
pability, a gradual diminishing of embodied possibilities and of 
meaningful and intentional relations to his own environment. 
His movements lack transcendence and are increasingly reduced 
to the concrete: “There are automatic reflexes for pretty much 
everything, it seems” (p. 229). His romantic, sexual, social and 
political possibilities are gone, and all that is left of him is the 
biological reality of the body of the “ageing animal, [that,] 
wounded and aware of being fatally injured, seeks a den in which 
to end his life” (291).
The impossibility to imagine the future also characterises the 
state of Western neoliberalist societies beyond the protagonist’s 
depression. As in most of his works, including Elementary Parti-
cles and Submission, the author sketches a world in which people 
have reached the limits of freedom (economically, sexually, and 
romantically). Too much freedom and too many choices have led 
to a state of meaninglessness and aimlessness, where the never- 
ending expansion of personal freedom is the only thing left to 
desire. A ‘gut feeling’ that is the affect of Florent Claude depres-
sion and that is possibly transmitted to the reader, is therefore 
also the political gut feeling to which populist politics are often 
said to appeal.40
This impotence to place his life in a larger scheme of meaning 
translates into an episodic, rather than narrative, organi-
sation of his discourse. We might describe Florent- Claude 
as an episodic personality, using a concept coined by Galen 
Strawson. Whereas scholars like Oliver Sacks have written 
about identity as essentially tied to narrative, and the way we 
live our lives as a story, psychologist Strawson argues against 
the universality of this thesis. Instead, he forges a distinction 
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between ‘episodic’ and ‘diachronic’ people. An ‘episodic’ is a 
person that conceives of her life as a series of discrete events, 
and sees herself as different people at the time of each event. 
Unlike ‘diachronics,’ people that see their life as a single narra-
tive with their self as the unchanging protagonist, “[e]pisodics 
are likely to have no particular tendency to see their life in 
Narrative terms.”41 They do not experience this continuity of 
a subjectivity that was there in the past, is still the same person 
in the present and will be there in the future. This fits well 
with experiences of depression, which, as argued, are marked 
by a problematic relation to futurity. Angela Woods has used 
Strawson’s theory of episodic personalities to nuance and 
complement the role of narrative in medical humanities.42 Sara 
Wasson has made a comparable point about experiences of 
chronic illness, which, she writes, is experienced in temporal 
terms as an insisting present, and therefore requires reading 
practices that are less concerned with narrative coherence and 
more with fragments and episodes.43
An episodic experience of time is on a par with Frank’s chaos 
narrative, which is typically expressed in a syntactic structure 
of ‘and then and then and then,’ a staccato pacing of words.44 
The “untellable silence” in such utterances, which are akin to 
expressions of trauma, “alternates with the insistent” and then 
“repetitions.”45 The chaos story, which as said is not a story at 
all, presents “time without sequence, telling without mediation, 
and speaking about oneself without being fully able to reflect 
on oneself.”46 It knows no “memorable past,” nor a “future 
worth anticipating,” only an “incessant present.”47 As such, 
the episodic and recurrent nature of depression goes against 
what Brenda Dyer has called the comic storyline, which she 
borrows from Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism (1957), 
and which corresponds to Frank’s restitution narrative. This 
narrative, she argues, has served the interests of psychiatry 
and the pharmaceutical industry and perpetuates North Amer-
ican values of “optimism and individual heroism.”48 Given the 
prevalence of ‘resilience’ as a core ideal in neoliberal societies, 
this suggests, there might be sociopolitical reasons for privi-
leging the episodic over the restitution narrative. Depression 
is cyclical, it often recurs in ‘episodes,’ and it does not always 
have a definitive conclusion or end.49 The novel has an open 
ending, leaving the protagonist’s fate suspended as he is para-
lysed and unable to takes his life and death into his own hands.
Florent- Claude watches from the sideline. This being extra-
neous to his own story is noticeable in a spatial—as he lives 
in impersonal hotel rooms and spies on his ex- lover from a 
distance—as well as a temporal sense: “I now had a sense that 
I was missing something of the reality of the world, that I was 
withdrawing from history” (p. 173). As is to be expected, his 
status as spatiotemporal outsider deeply informs his auto-
diegetic narration of the novel. The narrator has no power, 
will or energy to really tell a story with a strong sense of narra-
tive direction, and as a result, the text has an aimless, mean-
dering quality.
Houellebecq makes use of anti- cathartic devices: he dilates 
the narrative duration of Florent- Claude’s anticipations of, and 
preparations for, possible occurrences in the future. Examples 
include a sexual encounter with a young female tourist with 
chestnut hair he meets on the road in Alméria, the aforemen-
tioned murder of Camille’s son (he has a gun, positions himself 
at the ideal spot, even engages in detailed speculation on how 
the media will respond, and considers how to erase his DNA), 
and even his own suicide: “height, h, travelled by a body in 
free fall for a time, t, was in fact given precisely by the formula 
h=1/2gt2, with g being the gravitational constant, giving a falling 
time, for height h, of √2 h/g” (p. 304). In all these cases, duration 
of the narrative discourse slows down to build anticipation in 
the reader, who then, like the protagonist himself, ends up being 
disappointed by his lack of agency. If affects of frustration and 
oppression gradually build up in the reader, these are reinforced 
by such instances of anti- catharsis, which make sure we have 
no outlet, are not ‘purged’ of the depressive gut feeling. Unlike 
Greek tragedy, Serotonin offers no relief.
Thus, the temporal structure adds to a reading experience of 
a gradual blurring of temporal consciousness that is character-
istic of his depression. This experience is presented as a lack 
of a future, as well as increasingly standing outside of time and 
existence. For the reader, this is disorienting. Florent- Claude is 
overgrown by the past, whose images keep painfully impinging 
on him: “memories came back in a steady flow, it isn’t the 
future but the past that kills you, that comes back to torment 
and undermine you, and effectively ends up killing you” (p. 
245). All he does near the end of the story is making a selection 
of about thousand photographs from his computer to decorate 
the wall of his apartment (a “Facebook wall that would never 
be seen by anyone but me,” p. 300). It is a task that is “phys-
ically within [his] range” (p. 301), une tâche physiquement à 
ma portée. At this final point, his ‘I can’ is limited to what 
is at his fingertips. His past is quite literally overwriting his 
present and forming a cage in which he lives out his last days 
of embodied powerlessness. He allows the past to take over his 
present, as if he wishes to inhabit his own past like the room 
he lives in. It is a powerful image for the desynchronisation 
between self and world, the fall from the future to the present. 
This anti- narrative manner of presentation of experiences of 
depression also has an affective dimension that we discuss in 
the last section of this article.
Affective transference
Here, we consider how these disorienting narrative structures and 
certain thematic choices possibly affect the reading, by transmitting 
affects like disgust and dizziness. Because of Houellebecq’s choice 
to present a chaos narrative that orders events and memories in 
an anti- narrative, paratactic and episodic manner, an important 
stylistic affect of his discourse is the feeling of exhaustion at 
having said it all before, of having to repeat oneself over and over 
again. Critics have picked up on this sense of exhaustion—“the 
new Michel Houellebecq novel, Serotonin, is an exhausted and 
exhausting book”50—but unfairly attribute this to a writerly 
defect (“It makes you wonder if he has played out his string as a 
fiction writer”51). We argue that this affect is precisely intended to 
transmit the ‘gut feelings’ of depression to the reader. As we see it, 
Serotonin not only provides a picture of depression as an embodied 
condition, but Houellebecq’s way of writing can generate visceral 
responses in the reader. Affective transference goes hand in hand 
with the picture of depression as an embodied phenomenon.
Foregrounding hormonal imbalances and the modification and 
satisfaction of oral desires, and in line with Wilson’s claim that 
depression is an affliction of the ‘bioaffective system’,52 Houelle-
becq emphasises the gut feelings involved in depression as a bioaf-
fective phenomenon. Claire Lozier uses the notion of affect for 
her reading of Houellebecq’s Platform (2001).53 She argues that 
Houellebecq produces ‘signes empuissantisés’54 or ‘empowerised 
signs,’ ideas that have been equipped with ‘an emotional prosthesis’ 
(p. 170). Frantzen aptly describes Houellebecq’s oeuvre as a symp-
tomatology or ‘symptomatic discourse’ of depression, in that it 
evokes affects like ‘medicalized numbness’ beyond both happiness 
and unhappiness, hope or despair, and the aforementioned lack 
of desire or expectations.55 As Kinnunen and Kolehmainen write, 
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affect calls into question the boundaries between mind and body 
and between various bodies, and it can refer to bodily sensations, 
feelings and emotions as well as to non- conscious, incorporeal, 
trans- subjective and inter- corporeal sensations.56 It is especially in 
these latter characteristics, as trans- subjective and inter- corporeal, 
that affect has a relational dimension. According to the philosopher 
Bernard Stiegler, “Speaking about misery always entails exposing 
oneself to the risk of becoming miserable.”57 It is therefore only 
possible to speak of that which affects the depressed to the extent 
that you find yourself affected.
The narrator of Serotonin repeatedly refers to the shortcomings 
of language to express the essential: “the vocation of the word is 
not to create love but to engender division and hatred, the word 
separates as it produces” (p. 82) and “I would’ve liked to say some-
thing, find a phrase that expressed my gratitude and imagination; 
I searched frantically for something during the thirty seconds that 
it took me to put on my coat and walk through the door; but yet 
again words failed me” (p. 284). He has lost faith in communica-
tion and the ability to form meaningful human connections. After 
his diagnosis and his prescription for Captorix, Florent- Claude 
does not seem to identify with his predicament, or care about the 
label put on it. The word ‘depression’ only occurs twice in the 
novel, both times vocalised by doctor Azote. Nor is he plagued 
by extreme or even outspoken emotions. His depressive mood is 
described as “a peaceful, stable sadness, not susceptible to increase 
or decrease; a sadness, in short, that to all intents and purposes 
appeared definitive” (p. 78).
The focus on affect makes it possible to overcome the issue of 
how experiences of depression can be put into words in such a 
way that others can empathise with the depressed person. Affect 
can be transmitted by literary language through ‘embodied simu-
lation,’ the imagination of particulars beyond direct perception 
and memory. The reader becomes affected by and entangled in 
the material. In our analysis, we identified the following affective 
dimensions: appetite, disgust and nausea, and feelings of spatial 
and temporal disorientation. An almost obsessive consumption of 
food is a theme that runs throughout Houellebecq’s oeuvre. Often, 
he presents appetite as a substitute for the libido in Western culture. 
Serotonin brings the tropes of sexual and gastronomic desire 
together again: one young Dutch woman, in Florent- Claude’s eyes, 
looks “like an advertisement for Gouda” (p. 82).
Watching TV constantly, he notices that culinary shows rapidly 
multiply, leading the West into a regression to “the oral stage” (p. 
286). He understands that he himself will undergo a similar regres-
sion. When his libido has completely evaporated because of the 
antidepressant, he makes it a mission to empty his bank account 
by eating it up and eating himself to death: “to try and cultivate 
an interest in expensive and refined foods (Alba truffles? Maine 
lobsters?). I had just passed eighty kilos” (p. 306). Because of his 
increased cortisol level, it is inevitable that he will eat more and 
steadily gain weight. Having lost interest in sports programmes 
on TV, he spends his time watching cooking shows, becoming a 
“really old fat man” (p. 295). As the novel’s end nears, Florent- 
Claude finally loses interest in the culinary shows. His loss of 
appetite marks “the real start of [his] decline” (p. 296). Having 
invaded his entire body through gut and hormones, the depression 
has successively extinguished his sexual desires, his joie de vivre, 
and will eventually lead to his death, so he seems to suggest, when 
his oral desires extinguish as well. The protagonist’s omnivorous 
appetite gradually takes up more thematic space, as all his other 
interests evaporate. His descriptions of menus and wines become 
more elaborate and detailed, for instance, when he is meeting 
his ex- girlfriend Claire after many years, who turns out to be as 
unhappy as he is, and an alcoholic. Their dinner turns into an 
all- night drinking and eating binge that is continued with break-
fast and booze the next morning. Descriptions of Florent- Claude’s 
appetite transmit the quite contrary affect of nausea to the reader, 
as here it becomes painfully clear that we witness a character trying 
to eat and drink himself to death.
Even though gastrointestinal distress, or nausea, is 
mentioned as a common side effect of Captorix, Florent- 
Claude himself remains exempt from it. Where he enjoys a 
healthy appetite for most of the novel, it is the reader who is 
saddled with disgust and nausea, the most important affects 
here. Besides these lengthy scenes of eating and drinking, 
disgust and nausea are transmitted by long passages relating 
how the narrator’s girlfriend was taped having sex with dogs, 
how he witnesses a neighbour paedophile who is filming his 
naked 10- year- old victim, how he recalls a viewing of an art 
film depicting naked Japanese girls performing all kinds of 
acts with eels, octopuses, cockroaches and earworms. “In 
one video a Japanese girl caught the tentacles of an octopus 
coming out of the toilet bowl with her teeth. I don’t think 
I’ve ever seen anything so disgusting” (p. 39). Or how his 
doctor recommends the healing powers of “two little sixteen- 
year- old Thai hookers” (p. 135).
It is important to note that Florent- Claude is by no means 
morally outraged or even disgusted in any of these situations. 
His numbness of feeling translates itself to an alienating sense 
of neutrality. Watching his girlfriend engaged in a “canine mini- 
gangbang” (p. 42), he thinks it is disgusting, but mostly for the 
dogs. Watching the paedophile, he starts feeling “sick to [his] 
stomach after a while, “not because of the content but because of 
the filming; he must have crouched down to get her in a low- angle 
shot, he must have been hopping around her like an old toad” 
(p. 188). Watching the woman with the squid screened in an arts 
centre, he has to vomit but mostly reflects on his tendency to throw 
himself at the banquet on first chance, and that he should have 
waited until after the viewing. Besides these occasions where the 
narrator acts as a morally stoic, though bodily affected viewer, and 
transmits affects of disgust and nausea to the reader, there are also 
numerous plastic descriptions of possible ways to commit suicide 
or murder, which are literally ‘hard to stomach.’ In all these cases, 
the affect transmitted to the reader is not exactly the same affect 
the protagonist undergoes—by way of his stoicism, he evokes gut 
feelings of disgust.
A third and last affect we single out here are feelings of diso-
rientation and (spatiotemporal) confusion, closely related to 
the narrative and temporal dislocation discussed in the previous 
section. Here, we discuss them in terms of possible disorienting 
effects on the reader. Houellebecq renders Florent- Claude’s 
stream of consciousness in extremely long, digressive sentences, 
often consisting of multiple juxtapositions that build to an absurd, 
unexpected (anti- )climax. The narrator’s thoughts are incoherent 
and subject to abrupt shifts.58 Commas are used instead of periods. 
Run- on sentences like these can be described in terms of what 
Sianne Ngai fittingly calls ‘agglutination’: “the mass adhesion or 
coagulation of signifying units.”59 These are held together by a 
fairly simple syntax or organising principle, in this case separated 
by commas. Such sentences convey cognitive swings, fractures and 
flows of thought that befit the “cognitive mechanics of depression 
itself, whose salient feature is impaired concentration, a tendency 
to shift erratically among logical strands and the contours of 
myriad emotional states.”60 The effect of such ‘agglutination’ is 
dizziness, a sense of overload and lack of orientation that is related 
to the temporal dislocation of the narrative structure, but that here 
produces affects of vertigo.
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CONCLUSION
By giving his novel the title Serotonin, Houellebecq puts the reader 
somewhat on the wrong track. After all, it is often claimed that 
people who suffer from depression have a shortage of serotonin in 
their brains, because of which depression is readily regarded as a 
brain disease. However, as we have seen, the story of Florent Claude 
shows that depression is rather a disruption of one’s embodied ‘I can’ 
that affects one’s entire existence. That Houellebecq has chosen the 
title Serotonin for his novel is not because he supports the widespread 
‘chemical imbalance in the brain’ hypothesis. When the chemical 
serotonin has a specific value in this novel is because Houellebecq 
describes it as a kind of ‘social’ hormone, while claiming that it is 
“linked to self- esteem, to the sense of recognition obtained within a 
group” (p. 94). Serotonin, then, can be seen as some sort of ‘social 
glue,’ and it is particularly this social glue that seems to be lacking in 
Houellebecq’s universe of lonely, liberal individuals. Leaving aside 
what exactly causes depression (and serotonin deficiency), we can 
say that depression manifests itself in this novel both as a lack of 
social cohesion and as a disruption of individual existential possibili-
ties. The decline of social cohesion is thus by no means compensated 
by wilful and self- governing individuals. Social disintegration is rein-
forced by the decrease of embodied possibilities by means of which 
the depressive person is cut- off from her or his world. Depression, 
then, transforms people into ‘disconnected’ individuals. Since the 
experience of disconnectedness fractures lines of communication, 
the depression ‘illness narrative,’ which aims at sharing illness expe-
riences, is only possible as a chaos story, an anti- narrative. Narrative, 
after all, presupposes shared communal frameworks of meaning 
making. In Houellebecq’s universe, these are no longer available.
We argued that this lack of embodied possibilities, or the embodied 
‘I cannot,’ has consequences for the possibilities of giving narrative 
form to experiences of depression. Focusing on experiences of 
time in phenomenological accounts, we characterises depression in 
Houellebecq as a chronopathology: stuck in time, the narrator suffers 
from an incapacity to envision a future. The chaos narrative is an 
apt form for this, as it precludes closure or recovery. Houellebecq’s 
chaos narrative is in fact not really a narrative at all, as there is no 
clear sequence or discernible causality. Florent- Claude’s discourse is 
episodic, paratactic and open- ended. He never asks himself why this 
is happening to him. His position as a spatial and temporal outsider 
informs the narration: lacking the power, will or energy to tell a 
story with a sense of direction, he creates an aimless, meandering 
discourse fraught with anti- cathartic devices that announce, but do 
not deliver action. The desynchronisation between himself and the 
world, finally, does not leave the reader unaltered. The disorienting 
narrative structures affect our reading, by transmitting affects like 
disgust, dizziness and nausea.
Moving beyond the mind/body dualism prevalent in writing 
about depression, and resisting the tendency to talk about brain 
chemistry as a way of explaining our mental and emotional life, 
Houellebecq’s affective transmission of gut feelings intimates 
that conditions of existential crisis cannot be treated medically 
because they are a crisis of narrative, of time and meaning: 
“nothing had given me the feeling that I had a place to live, 
a context, let alone a reason” (p. 306). As such, Houellebecq’s 
‘anti- narrative’ forms an important contribution to the pathog-
raphy of depression since it succeeds in passing on to the reader 
the experience of incapacity, impotence, a debilitating gut feeling 
and a gradual loss of grip that manifests itself as a temporal and 
spatial disorientation.
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